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Abstract. Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of
research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality.
Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose
to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed
several schemes to resist “quantum attacks”. In particular, for electronic
voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum me-
chanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with
a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has differ-
ent objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never
formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this
paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting
protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these
works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are
correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases,
we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We
argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal se-
curity models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing
cryptographic literature.
Keywords: quantum electronic voting, quantum networks, quantum cryptog-
raphy, attacks
1 Introduction
Voting is a fundamental procedure in democratic societies. With the technolog-
ical advances of the computer era, voting processes can also benefit to become
more secure and efficient and as a result more democratic. Indeed, compared to
previous manual procedures, electronic voting systems can offer more efficient
elections with higher voter participation, better accuracy, while also providing
enhanced security guarantees, such as vote-privacy and voter-verification even
in the face of untrusted election authorities. For this reason, over the last two
decades, several cryptographic protocols such as Helios [1], JCJ/Civitas [25],
Scantegrity [9], Demos [28], or Preˆt-a`-Voter [40] to name just a few, have been
proposed and implemented for electronic voting.
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All these systems base their security on the assumption that certain problems
are computationally hard; typical examples include problems such as integer fac-
torization and discrete logarithm, which are well known to be easy to solve with
quantum computers. Indeed, Shor’s algorithm [42] allows for large integers to
be factored efficiently, and also solves the discrete logarithm problem. Although
we do not yet have quantum computers, recent technological advances indicate
that these will soon be reality. In this context, and motivated by the fact that
quantum computers will be a threat to existing classical cryptographic proto-
cols, researchers have proposed to use quantum communication to implement
cryptographic primitives like key distribution, bit commitment, coin flipping and
oblivious transfer. Unfortunately, perfect security (i.e. where the best adversarial
strategy does not provide better winning probabilities than an honest strategy)
with no assumptions has proven to be impossible in the quantum setting for any
cryptographic primitive [31,33]. In order to achieve this level of security, we need
to study different corruption models, under which it might be possible to prove
security for the honest participants. Typical examples include limiting the num-
ber of dishonest participants that the adversary can compromise, introducing
different non-collaborating authorities, etc.
A decade of studies on quantum electronic voting has resulted in several pro-
tocols that use the properties of quantum mechanical systems in order to achieve
specific requirements such as vote privacy, correctness and verifiability, in the
presence of quantum adversaries. However, all these new protocols are studied
against different and not well-articulated corruption models, and claim security
using ad-hoc proofs that are not formalized and backed only against a limited
class of quantum attacks. In particular, none of the proposed schemes provides
rigorous definitions of privacy and verifiability, nor formal security proofs against
specific, well-defined (quantum) attacker models. When it comes to electronic
voting schemes, it is particularly hard to ensure that all the, somehow conflict-
ing, properties hold; it is therefore important that these new quantum protocols
be rigorously and mathematically studied and the necessary assumptions and
limitations formally established.
This is precisely what we set to address in this paper. That is, we system-
atize and assess the security of existing e-voting protocols based on quantum
technology. We examine the claims of each of these solutions concerning privacy,
correctness and verifiability, and evaluate them against their intended properties.
Unfortunately our analyses uncover vulnerabilities in all the proposed schemes.
While some of them suffer from trivial attacks due to inconsistencies in the secu-
rity definitions, the main contribution of the paper is to argue that sophisticated
attacks can exist even in protocols that “seem secure”, if the security is proven
ad hoc, and not in a formal framework. Specifically, we show that we can con-
struct efficient quantum attackers that break the assumed properties of these
protocols by corrupting a fraction of voters (whatever small or big). We argue
that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security proofs in an
appropriate security framework.
A Comprehensive Analysis of Quantum E-voting Protocols 3
It is therefore the aim of this work to highlight the importance of formally
defining and proving security in the relatively new field of quantum cryptography,
following the steps of seminal works like [2,39] and [45]. In general, our work
aims at motivating researchers to study cryptographic primitives under a new
quantum perspective, in order to help secure future communication networks in
the quantum era to come. This also includes studying classical protocols that are
secure against computationally unbounded attackers such as the ones proposed
in [6], as well as protocols that rely for their security on problems believed to
be hard to solve even for quantum computers; one such example of an e-voting
protocol adapting based on lattices is presented in [11], based on the work of [1].
However, it is out of the scope of this study to review such classical protocols,
as we are focusing on the possible contribution of quantum computers to the
security of e-voting.
Contributions of this paper: We propose a systematization of quantum elec-
tronic voting approaches based on their key technical features. To the best of
our knowledge, our study covers all relevant research in the field, identifying four
main families of quantum schemes for electronic voting. We evaluate the security
of each scheme against privacy, correctness, and verifiability of each scheme, and
uncover vulnerabilities in all these schemes:
– Two measurement bases based protocols - These protocols rely on two mea-
surement bases to verify the correct distribution of an entangled state. We
demonstrate an attack against recent works that breaks the privacy prop-
erty, when a fraction of voters is corrupted. We specifically prove that the
probability that a number of corrupted states are not tested and used later
in the protocol, is non-negligible. We then show how this can be exploited
to break voters’ vote privacy. Furthermore, even if the states are shared by a
trusted authority, we show that privacy can still be violated in case of abort.
– Traveling ballot protocols - The main idea of these protocols is that the
“ballot box” circulates among all voters which apply a unitary to it in order
to add their vote. However, we show how colluding voters can break honest
voters’ vote privacy just by measuring the ballot box before and after the
victim has cast their ballot. These protocols further suffer as we will see from
double voting attacks, whereby a dishonest voter can simply apply multiple
time the voting operator.
– Quantum distributed ballot protocols - These schemes aim at addressing the
shortcomings of traveling ballot protocols by having each voter vote on a
distinct although entangled system and combining them homomorphically.
We present an attack that allows the adversary to double-vote and therefore
change the outcome of the voting process with probability at least 0.25, if
the protocol runs fewer than exponentially many rounds in the number of
voters. The intuition behind this attack is that an adversary does not need
to find exactly how the ballots have been created in order to influence the
outcome of the election; it suffices to find a specific relation between them
from left-over voting ballots provided by the corrupted voters.
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– Conjugate coding based protocols - These protocols exploit BB84 states adding
some verification mechanism. The main issue with these schemes, as we show,
is that ballots are malleable, allowing an attacker to modify the part of the
ballot which encodes the candidate choice to their advantage.
Finally, we identify and discuss current challenges, indicating future research
directions.
Outline of this paper: In Section 2 we give the necessary background for
understanding the rest of the paper. Section 3 deals with protocols based on
two measurement bases. In Section 4 we discuss the traveling ballot family of
protocols. Section 5 is dedicated to the distributed ballot family of protocols,
and in Section 6 we describe and analyze schemes based on conjugate coding.
In Section 7, we briefly mention some other less promising proposals. Finally, in
Section 8, we discuss possible solutions and observations for quantum e-voting
to be of practical use in future quantum communication networks. Due to lack
of space, the details of the proofs are omitted, but are available in the Supple-
mentary Material at the end of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum Computation
We use the term quantum bit or qubit [41,35] to denote the simplest quantum
mechanical object we will use. We say that a qubit is in a pure state if it can be
expressed as a linear combination of other pure states:
|x〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 , where |0〉 =
[
1
0
]
, |1〉 =
[
0
1
]
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 for any α, β ∈ C. The states |0〉 and |1〉 are called the
computational basis vectors. Sometimes it is also helpful to think of a qubit as
a vector in the two-dimensional Hilbert space H. If a qubit cannot be written in
the above form, then we say it is in a mixed state. The generalization of a qubit
to an m-dimensional quantum system is called qudit :
|y〉 =
m−1∑
j=0
aj |j〉 , where
m−1∑
j=0
|aj |2 = 1
Let’s now suppose that we have two qubits; we can write the state vector as:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
αij |ij〉
where
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
|αij |2 = 1. If the total state vector |ψ〉 cannot be written as a
tensor product of two qubits (i.e. |x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉), then we say that qubits |x1〉 and
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|x2〉 are entangled. A well-known example of two-qubit entangled states, are the
four maximally entangled Bell states, which form a basis of the two-dimensional
Hilbert space:
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)
A quantum system that is in one of the above states is also called an EPR pair,
from the famous paradox [17].
The way we obtain information about a quantum system is by performing a
measurement using a family of linear operators {Mj} acting on the state space
of the system, where j denotes the different outcomes of the measurement. It
holds that: ∑
j
M†jMj = I
and for the continuous case: ∫
M†jMjdj = I
where M†j is the conjugate transpose of matrix Mj , and I the identity operator.
In the case of qudit |y〉 (as defined above), the probability that the measurement
outcome is w is:
Pr(w) = 〈y|M†wMw |y〉
and in the continuous case
Pr(w ∈ [w1, w2]) =
∫ w2
w1
〈y|M†jMj |y〉 dj
In the case of a single qubit |x〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉, measurement in the computational
basis will give outcome zero with probability |α|2 and outcome one with proba-
bility |β|2. If our state is entangled, a partial measurement (i.e. a measurement
in one of the entangled qudits), not only reveals information about the measured
qudit, but possibly about the remaining state. For example, let us recall the Bell
state |Φ+〉. A measurement of the first qubit in the computational basis will give
measurement outcome 0 or 1 with equal probability and the remaining qubit
will collapse to the state |0〉 or |1〉 respectively.
In quantum cryptography, the correlations in the measurement outcomes of
entangled states are frequently exploited. Another entangled state of interest
that we will use in Section 3, gives measurement outcomes that sum up to zero
when measured in the computational basis, and equal outcomes when measured
in the Fourier basis (denoted by |〉F ). In the three-qubit case, the state is the
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following:
|D〉 = 1√
3
( |0〉F |0〉F |0〉F + |1〉F |1〉F |1〉F )
=
1
4
( ∑
j1+j2+j3=0 mod 2
2 |j1〉 |j2〉 |j3〉+
∑
j1+j2+j3 6=0 mod 2
(
1 + epii
) |j1〉 |j2〉 |j3〉 )
=
1
2
( |000〉+ |011〉+ |101〉+ |110〉 )
Finally, the evolution of a closed quantum system can be described by the appli-
cation of a unitary operator. Unitary operators are reversible and preserve the
inner product. Recall our first example, and let’s say we would like to swap the
amplitudes on state |x〉, then we can apply the operator Z (also known as the
NOT-gate):
Z |x〉 = β |0〉+ α |1〉 , where Z =
[
0 1
1 0
]
The Z-gate is one of the Pauli operators (the others being the X and Y ), which
together with the identity operator I, form a basis for the vector space of 2× 2
Hermitian matrices. The Pauli operators are unitaries, therefore as mentioned
above, they also preserve the inner product.
A very important difference between quantum and classical information, is
that there is no mechanism to create a copy of an unknown quantum state
[41,35]. This result, known as the no-cloning theorem, is one of the fundamental
advantages and at the same time limitations of quantum information. It becomes
extremely relevant for cryptography, since brute-force types of attacks cannot be
applied on quantum channels that carry unknown information. When verifying
quantum resources however, it is necessary to apply a cut-and-choose technique
in order to test that the received quantum states are correcting produced. The
quantum source would therefore need to send exponentially many copies (with
respect to the security parameter of the protocol) of the quantum state [26],
in order for the verifier to measure most of them and deduce that with high
probability, the remaining ones are correct.
2.2 Electronic Voting
In general, electronic voting protocols consist of election authorities, talliers, vot-
ers and bulletin boards [25,28,1]. In this work, we will be dealing with protocols
involving one tallier and/or one election authority (which we will denote with T
and EA respectively), as well as a set of voters V = {Vk}Nk=1. Their role in the
protocol is for EA to set the parameters of the protocol, V to cast their ballots
and T to gather the votes and compute and announce the result of the election.
Ideally, an e-voting protocol needs to fulfill the following properties:
– Correctness: The protocol should behave as intended if the adversary doesn’t
interfere at all, i.e. should allow to the parties to carry out an election.
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– Accountability / double voting: Only eligible voters are allowed to vote at
most once.
– Privacy [4]: The vote of a voter should remain private, i.e. there should not
exist an efficient procedure with which an adversary can extract information
about the way a voter voted.
– Verifiability[13]: Voter, and/or external entities to the protocol called audi-
tors, should be able to verify that their vote, or in the case of auditors the
total votes, have been counted as intended.
– Receipt freeness [15]: A voter should not be able to prove how they voted to
avoid vote selling.
For the purpose of this work we do not need formal definitions of these
properties as we mainly focus on attacks. As we will see, these attacks violate
in an obvious way the intended properties of any electronic voting system and
would be captured by any reasonable definition. It should however be noted
that coming up with appropriate definitions for the desired properties is not
straightforward and remains still a very active area of research [10]. In classical
cryptography, there were efforts to tackle this difficulty by using automated
provers and model checkers such as EasyCrypt [12], game based definitions (as in
the surveys [13,4]), and by employing the Universal Composability Framework
[7,20]. However, in quantum cryptography, it remains unclear how a similar
approach can be adopted. An interesting approach appears in [18], where the
authors provide an automated verification tool, named QMC (Quantum Model)
that enables checking properties of systems which can be expressed within the
quantum stabilizer formalism. Finally, a recent work by Unruh [46] on quantum
relational Hoare logic might open new avenues and help provide a solution to
this problem.
3 Dual Basis Measurement Based Protocols
In this section we discuss a family of quantum voting protocols that exploit for
their security the dual basis measurement technique. We will specifically study
protocols [48] and [24] that use as a blank ballot an entangled state with an
interesting property: when measured in the computational basis, the sum of the
outcomes is equal to zero, while when measured in the Fourier basis, all the
outcomes are equal. Both of these protocols use cut-and-choose techniques in
order to verify that the state was distributed correctly. This means that a large
amount of states are checked for correctness and a remaining few are kept at the
end unmeasured, to proceed with the rest of the protocol. Although a cut-and-
choose technique with just one verifying party is secure if the states that are
sampled are exponentially many and the remaining ones are constant, it is not
clear how this generalizes to a setting where there are multiple verifying parties.
In particular, if we consider an adversary who generates the blank ballots and
can corrupt an arbitrary fraction of the voters, it turns out that the probability
that some corrupted states are not tested, is non-negligible with respect to the
security parameter of the protocol. Specifically, we show that if the corrupted
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parties sample their states last, then the probability with which the corrupted
states are not checked and remain after all the honest parties sample, is at least
a constant with respect to the security parameter of the protocol.
In the following, we will present one of the dual basis protocols [48] and show
how to construct a polynomial quantum adversary that violates privacy with
non-negligible probability with respect to δ0, without getting detected.
3.1 Protocol Specification
The self-tallying protocol of Wang et al. [48] is based on the classical protocol
of [27]. The voters {Vk}Nk=1, without the presence of any trusted authority or
tallier, need to verify that they share specific quantum states. At the end of the
verification process, the voters share a classical matrix; every cast vote is equal
to the sum of the elements of a row in the matrix. The protocol goes as follows:
1. One of the voters, not necessarily trusted, prepares N + N2δ0 states of the
form:
|D1〉 = 1√
mN−1
∑
∑N
k=1 ik=0 mod c
|i1〉 |i2〉 . . . |iN 〉
where m is the dimension of the qudits’ Hilbert space, c is the number of
the possible candidates such that m ≥ c and δ0 the security parameter. The
voter also shares 1 +N2δ0 states of the form:
|D2〉 = 1√
N !
∑
(i1,i2,...,iN )∈PN
|i1〉 |i2〉 . . . |iN 〉
where PN is the set of all possible permutations with N elements. Each Vk
receives the kth particle from each of the states.
2. The voters agree that the states they receive are indeed |D1〉 , |D2〉 by using
a cut-and choose technique. Specifically, voter Vk chooses at random 2
δ0 of
the |D1〉 states and asks the other voters to measure half of their particles in
the computational and half in the Fourier basis. Whenever the chosen basis
is the computational, the measurement results need to add up to 0, while
when the basis is the Fourier, then the measurement results are all the same.
All voters simultaneously broadcast their results and if one of them notices
a discrepancy, the protocol aborts. The states |D2〉 are checked in a similar
way.
3. The voters are left to share N copies of |D1〉 states and one |D2〉 state. Each
voter holds one qudit for each state. They now all measure their qudits in the
computational basis. As a result, each Vk holds a “blank ballot” of dimension
N with the measurement outcomes corresponding to parts of |D1〉 states:
Bk = [ξ
1
k · · · ξskkk · · · ξNk ]ᵀ
and a unique index, skk ∈ {1, . . . , N}, from the measurement outcome of the
qudit that belongs to |D2〉. The set of all the blank ballots has the property∑N
k=1 ξ
j
k = 0 mod c for all j = 1, . . . , N .
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4. Based on skk, all voters add their vote, vk ∈ Zc, to the corresponding row
of their “secret” column. Specifically, Vk applies ξ
skk
k → ξskkk + vk.
5. All voters simultaneously broadcast their columns, resulting in a public N ×
N table, whose k-th column encodes Vk’s candidate choice.
B =

ξ1k
...
Bv11 · · · ξskkk + vk · · · BvNN
...
ξNk

6. Each Vk can now check that their vote has been counted, by checking that
the corresponding row of the matrix adds up to their vote. If the check fails,
the protocol aborts.
7. Each voter can tally the final outcome of the election by computing the sum
of the elements of each row of the public N × N table. The resulting N
elements are the result of the election.
3.2 Vulnerabilities Of Dual Basis Measurement Protocols
In this section we present an attack on the cut-and-choose technique of the
protocol (step 2), that can be used to violate privacy. We consider a static
adversary that corrupts t voters, including the one that distributes the states in
step 1. Suppose that the adversary corrupts N out of N +N2δ0 states |D1〉. We
denote with Bad, the event that all the corrupted voters choose last (i.e. after
the honest voters) which states they want to test, and with Win, the event that
the N corrupted states are not checked.
We want to compute the probability that event Win happens, given event
Bad, i.e. the probability none of the N corrupted states is checked by the honest
voters, and therefore remain intact until the corrupted voters’ turn. The cor-
rupted voters will of course not sample any of the corrupted states and therefore
the corrupted states will be accepted as valid.
The number of corrupted states that an honest voter will check, follows a
mixture distribution with each mixture component being one of the hypergeo-
metric distributions {HG(Lik , bik , 2δ0) : 0 ≤ bik ≤ N} , where Lik is the number
of states left to sample from the previous voter and bik the number of the re-
maining corrupted states.
We can therefore define the random variable Xik that follows the above
mixture distribution, where i1, . . . , iN−t is a permutation of the honest voters’
indices (by slightly abusing notation, we consider the first N − t voters to be
honest). The following lemma is proven by induction:
Lemma 1. Let Xik be a random variable that follows the previous mixture dis-
tribution. It holds that:
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Pr[
N−t∑
k=1
Xik = 0] =
N−t∏
k=1
Pr[X∗ik = 0]
where X∗ik ∼ HG(Lik , N, 2δ0).
We are now ready to prove the next proposition which establishes that with at
least a constant probability, the corrupted states will remain intact until the end
of the verification process (the corrupted voters will of course choose not to test
any of them).
Proposition 1. For 0 < ε < 1, let t = εN be the fraction of voters controlled
by the adversary. It holds that :
Pr[Win | Bad] >
(ε
2
)N
Proof.
Pr[Win | Bad] = Pr[
N−t∑
k=1
Xik = 0] =
N−t∏
k=1
P [X∗ik = 0]
=
N−t−1∏
k=0
(
N +N2δ0 −N − k2δ0
2δ0
)
/
(
N +N2δ0 − k2δ0
2δ0
)
=
(N + t2δ0 −N + 1) · . . . · (N + t2δ0)
(N +N2δ0 −N + 1) · . . . · (N +N2δ0)
>
( t2δ0 + 1
N +N2δ0
)N
=
( t2δ0
N +N2δ0
+
1
N +N2δ0
)N
>
( t2δ0
N +N2δ0
)N
=
( ε
2−δ0 + 1
)N
>
(ε
2
)N
The question now is with what probability event Bad occurs, i.e how likely
is the fact that voters controlled by the adversary are asked to sample last? The
answer is irrelevant, because this probability depends on N and t, and are both
independent of δ0. As a result,
Pr[Win] > Pr[Win | Bad] Pr[Bad] = (ε/2)Nf(N, t)
where f(N, t) is a constant function with respect to the security parameter of
the protocol δ0, making Pr[Win] non-negligible in δ0. As a matter of fact, a
static adversary will corrupt the voters that maximize Pr[Bad]. Therefore, we
can assume that the honest voters sample the states at random, in order to not
favor sets of corrupted voters. Now let us examine how this affects the privacy
of the scheme.
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Theorem 1. Let Π(N, t, δ0) be an execution of the self-tallying protocol with N
voters, t of them corrupted, and δ0 the security parameter. We can construct an
adversary A, which with non-negligible probability in δ0 violates privacy without
getting detected by the honest voters.
Proof. Let CA be the set of indices of the corrupted voters, where |CA| = t.
Suppose that the voter who distributes the states is also corrupted, and prepares
1 +N2δ0 states of the form of |D2〉, N2δ0 states of the form |D1〉 and N states
of the form:
|DCorrupt〉 = |ξ1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ξN 〉
where ξk ∈R {0, . . . , c − 1} for all k ∈ {2, . . . , N}, and ξ1 ∈ {0, . . . , c − 1} such
that4:
ξ1 + . . .+ ξN = 0 mod c
From Proposition 1 and the previous observations we know that the prob-
ability that states |DCorrupt〉 remain intact after the verification procedure in
step 2 (i.e. event Win), happens with non-negligible probability in the security
parameter δ0. Therefore, with non-negligible probability, the remaining states in
step 3 are: one of the form |D2〉 and N of the form |DCorrupt〉. All honest voters
Vk measure their qudits in the computational basis and end up with a secret
number skk (from measuring the corresponding part of |D2〉) and a column
Bk = [ξ
1
k . . . ξ
skk
k . . . ξ
N
k ]
ᵀ
(from measuring states |DCorrupt〉), that is known to the adversary. Now all
voters apply their vote vk to the Bk according to skk. As a result:
Bvkk = [ξ
1
k . . . ξ
skk
k + vk . . . ξ
N
k ]
ᵀ
At this point all voters simultaneously broadcast their Bvkk , as the protocol
specifies, and they end up with the matrix B = (Bv11 . . . B
vN
N ). Each Vk, k 6∈ CA
checks that:
N∑
j=1
B[skk, j] = vk mod c
which happens with probability 1 from the description of the attack in the pre-
vious steps. As a result, each voter accepts the election result. The adversary
knowing both the pre-vote matrix and the post-vote matrix can therefore extract
the vote of all honest voters.
A similar attack can be mounted if the adversary instead of corrupting N out
of N +N2δ0 |D1〉 states, corrupts just 1 of the |D2〉 states. The attack is pretty
similar to the attack mentioned above but in this case the adversary knows the
4 The symbol ∈R denotes that the element is chosen uniformly at random from a
specific domain.
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row in which each voter voted instead of the pre-vote matrix. Moreover, the
probability of theorem 1 is improved from (ε/2)N to ε/2 (the proof works in a
similar way).
So far we have seen how voters’ privacy can be violated if an adversary
distributes the quantum states in the protocol. However, even if the sharing
of the states is done honestly by a trusted authority, still an adversary A can
violate the privacy of a voter. This is done by replacing one element in a column
of one of the players controlled by A with a random number. As a result, in
step 6), the honest voter whose row doesn’t pass the test, will abort the protocol
by broadcasting it. A will therefore know the identity of the voter aborting and
their corresponding vote, since it knows the matrix before the modification of the
column element. A possible solution might be the use of a classical anonymous
broadcast channel, so that the voters can anonymously broadcast abort if they
detect any misbehaviour at step 6). However, this might open a path to other
types of attacks, like denial-of-service, and requires further study in order to be
a valuable solution.
4 Traveling Ballot Based Protocols
In this section we discuss the traveling ballot family of protocols for referendum
type elections. Here, the tallier T also plays the role of EA, as it sets up the
parameters of the protocol in addition to producing the election result. Specifi-
cally, it prepares two entangled qudits, and sends one of them (the ballot qudit)
to travel from voter to voter. When the voters receive the ballot qudit, they
apply some unitary operation according to their vote choice and forward the
qudit to the next voter. When all voters have voted, the ballot qudit is sent back
to T who can now measure the whole state in order to compute the result of
the referendum. The first quantum scheme in this category was introduced by
Vaccaro et al. [47] and later improved by others [5,22,30].
4.1 Protocol Specification
We here present variant [22] of the traveling ballot protocol; an alternative form
of the protocol [47], encodes the vote in a phase factor rather than in the qudit
itself.
1. T prepares the state:
|Ω0〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
|j〉V |j〉T ,
keeps the second qudit and passes the first (the ballot qudit) to voter V1.
2. For k = 1, . . . , N , Vk receives the ballot qudit and applies the unitary U
vk =
N−1∑
j=0
|j + 1〉 〈j|, where vk = 1 signifies a “yes vote and vk = 0 a “no” vote
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(i.e. applying the identity operator). Then, Vk forwards the ballot qudit to
the next voter Vk+1 (VN sends the ballot qudit back to T ).
3. The global state held by T after all voters have voted, is:
|ΩN 〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
|j +m〉V |j〉T
where m is the number of “yes” votes.
4. T measures the two qudits in the computational basis. By subtracting the
two results, T obtains the election result m, and announces it to all voters.
4.2 Vulnerabilities Of Traveling Ballot Based Protocols
The first obvious weakness of this type of protocols is that they are subject to
double voting. A corrupted voter can apply the “yes” unitary operation many
times without being detected (this issue is addressed in the next session, where
we study the distributed ballot voting schemes). Furthermore, these protocols are
subject to privacy attacks, when several voters are colluding. In what follows, we
describe such an attack on privacy, in the case of two colluding voters. Figure 1
depicts this attack.
Let us assume that the adversary corrupts voters Vk−1 and Vk+1 for any k.
Upon receipt of the ballot qudit, instead of applying the appropriate unitary,
Vk−1 performs a measurement on the traveling ballot in the computational basis.
As a result the global state becomes:
|Ωk−1〉 = |h+m〉V ⊗ |h〉T
where |h+m〉V is one of the possible eigenstates of the observableO =
N−1∑
j=0
|j〉 〈j|,
and m is the number of “yes” votes cast by the voters V1, . . . , Vk−2 (note that
Vk−1 does not get any other information about the votes of the previous voters,
except number h+m). Then Vk−1 passes the ballot qudit |h+m〉V to Vk, who
applies the respective unitary for voting “yes” or “no”. As a result the ballot
qudit is in the state |h+m+ vk〉V . Next, the ballot qudit is forwarded to the
corrupted voter Vk+1, who measures it again in the computational basis and
gets the result h + m + vk. The adversary can now infer vote vk from the two
measurement results and figure out how Vk+1 voted.
The same attack can also be applied in the case where there are many voters
between the two corrupted parties. In this case the adversary can’t learn the
individual votes but only the total votes, which still constitutes a privacy leakage.
One suggestion presented in [47] is to allow T to perform extra measurements
to detect a malicious action during the protocol’s execution. However, this only
identifies an attack and does not prevent the adversary from learning some of
the votes, as described above. Furthermore, the probability of detecting a devi-
ation from the protocol is constant and as such does not depend on the security
parameter and does not lead to a substantial improvement of security. It should
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Fig. 1. Adversary corrupts voters Vk−1,Vk+1 and learns how the intermediate voter Vk
voted with probability 1.
also be noted that verifiability of the election result is not addressed in any of
these works, since T is assumed to generate the initial state honestly. In the case
where T is corrupted, privacy is trivially violated.
All traveling ballot protocols proposed [47,5,22,30] suffer from the above pri-
vacy attack. In the next section we will discuss how this issue has been addressed
in these works by revisiting the structure of the protocols. Unfortunately, as we
will now see, new issues arise.
5 Distributed Ballot Based Protocols
Here we describe the quantum distributed ballot protocols presented in [47,5] and
[22]. In these schemes, T prepares and distributes to each voter a blank ballot,
and gathers it back after all voters have cast their vote in order to compute the
final outcome. This type of protocols give strong guarantees for privacy against
other voters but not against a malicious T which is trusted to prepare correctly
specific states. So it is not hard to see that if the states are not the correct ones,
then the privacy of a voter can be violated.
A first attempt presented in [47] suffers from double voting similarly to the
discussion in the previous section. The same problem also appears in [16]. Later
works [5,22] address this issue with a very elaborate countermeasure. The intu-
ition behind the proposed technique is that T chooses a secret number δ accord-
ing to which it prepares two different quantum states: the “yes” and the “no”
states. This δ value is hard to predict due to the non-orthogonality of the shared
states and the no-cloning theorem. The authors suggest that many rounds of the
protocol be executed. As a result, any attempt of the adversary to learn δ gives
rise to a different result in each round. However, the number of required rounds,
as well as a rigorous proof are not presented in the study.
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More importantly, a careful analysis reveals that the proposed solution is still
vulnerable to double voting. As we will see, an adversary can mount what we call
a d-transfer attack, and transfer d votes for one option of the referendum election
to the other. To achieve this attack, the adversary does not need to find the exact
value of δ (as the authors believed), but knowing the difference of the angles used
to create the “yes” and “no” states suffices. We construct a polynomial quantum
adversary that performs the d-transfer attack with probability at least 0.25, if
the number of rounds is smaller than exponential in the number of voters. As a
result this makes the protocol practically unrealistic for large scale elections.
5.1 Protocol Specification
We first present the protocol from [5,22]:
1. T prepares an N -qudit ballot state:
|Φ〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
|j〉⊗N
where the states |j〉 , j = 0, ..., D − 1, form an orthonormal basis for the D-
dimensional Hilbert space, and D > N . The k-th qudit of |Φ〉 corresponds
to the blank ballot of Vk.
2. T sends to Vk the corresponding blank ballot together with two option qudits,
one for the “yes” and one for the “no” option:
yes: |ψ(θy)〉 = 1√D
∑D−1
j=0 e
ijθy |j〉 ,no: |ψ(θn)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijθn |j〉
For v ∈ {y, n} we have θv = (2pilv/D) + δ, where lv ∈ {0, . . . , D − 1} and
δ ∈ [0, 2pi/D). Values ly and δ are chosen uniformly at random from their
domain and ln is chosen such that N(ly − ln mod D) < D . These values
are known only to T .
3. Each Vk decides on “yes” or “no” by appending the corresponding op-
tion qudit to the blank ballot and performing a 2-qudit measurement R =∑D−1
r=0 rPr, where:
Pr =
D−1∑
j=0
|j + r〉 〈j + r| ⊗ |j〉 〈j|
According to the result rk, Vk performs a unitary correction Urk = I ⊗∑D−1
j=0 |j + rk〉 〈j| and sends the 2-qudits ballot along with rk back to T .
4. The global state of the system (up to normalization) is:
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
N∏
k=1
αj,rk |j〉⊗2N
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where,
αj,rk =
{
ei(D+j−rk)θ
k
v , 0 ≤ j ≤ rk − 1
ei(j−rk)θ
k
v rk ≤ j ≤ D − 1
5. For every k, using the announced results rk, T applies the unitary operator:
Wk =
rk−1∑
j=0
e−iDδ |j〉 〈j|+
D−1∑
j=rk
|j〉 〈j|
on one of the qudits in the global state (it is not important on which one,
since changes to the phase factor of a qudit that is part of a bigger entangled
state take effect globally). Now T has the state:
|Ωm〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eij(mθy+(N−m)θn) |j〉⊗2N
where m is the number of “yes” votes.
6. By applying the unitary operator
∑D−1
j=0 e
−ijNθn |j〉 〈j| on one of the qudits
and setting q = m(ly − ln), we have:
|Ωq〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
e2piijq/D |j〉⊗2N
We note here that q must be between 0 and D−1, so that the different outcomes
of the election be distinguishable. Now with the corresponding measurement T
can retrieve q. Since T knows the values ly and ln, it can then derive the number
m of “yes” votes. Note that if a voter does not send back a valid ballot, the
protocol execution will abort.
5.2 Vulnerabilities Of Distributed Ballot Protocols
In this section, we show how the adversary can perform the d-transfer attack
in favor of the “yes” outcome. We proceed as follows. We first show that this
is possible if the adversary knows the difference ly − ln. We then show how
the adversary can find out this value, and conclude the section with the prob-
abilistic analysis of our attack which establishes that it can be performed with
overwhelming probability in the number of voters.
The d-transfer attack: Given the difference ly − ln, a dishonest voter can
violate the no-double-voting property. From the definition of ly and ln it holds
that:
2pi(ly − ln)/D = θy − θn (1)
If a corrupted voter (for example V1) knows ly − ln, then they will proceed as
follows (w.l.o.g. we assume that they want to increase the number of “yes” votes
by d):
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1. V1 applies the unitary operator:
Cd =
D−1∑
j=0
eijd(θy−θn) |j〉 〈j|
to the received option qudit |ψ(θy)〉. As a result, the state becomes:
Cd |ψ(θy)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijd(θy−θn)eijθy |j〉
2. V1 now performs the 2-qudit measurement specified in step 3 of the protocol
and obtains the outcome r1.
3. V1 performs the unitary correction Ur1 . The global state now is:
Ur1Pr1
( |Φ〉 ⊗ Cd |ψ(θy)〉 ) =
1√
D
[ r1−1∑
j=0
ei(D+j−r1)θ˜ |j〉⊗N+1 +
D−1∑
j=r1
ei(j−r1)θ˜ |j〉⊗N+1
]
where θ˜ = d(θy − θn) + θy.
4. Before sending the two qudit ballot and the value r1 to T , V1 performs the
following operation to the option qudit:
Correctr1 =
{
e−iDd(θy−θn) |j〉 〈j| , 0 ≤ j ≤ r1 − 1
|j〉 〈j| r1 ≤ j ≤ D − 1
5. After all voters have cast their ballots to T , the global state of the system
(up to normalization) is:
1√
D
(
r1−1∑
j=0
ei(j−r1)d(θy−θn)ei(D+j−r1)θy
N∏
k=2
αj,rk |j〉⊗2N
+
D−1∑
j=r1
ei(j−r1)d(θy−θn)ei(j−r1)θy
N∏
k=2
αj,rk |j〉⊗2N )
where,
αj,rk =
{
ei(D+j−rk)θ
k
v , 0 ≤ j ≤ rk − 1
ei(j−rk)θ
k
v rk ≤ j ≤ D − 1
and θkv describes the vote of voter Vk, where v ∈ {y, n}. T just follows the
protocol specification. It applies some corrections on the state given the
announced results rk and finally the state becomes:
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
ei(j−r1)d(θy−θn)ei(j−r1)θy · . . . · ei(j−rn)θnv |j〉⊗2N
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which under a global phase factor is equivalent to:
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijd(θy−θn)eij(mθy+(N−m)θn) |j〉⊗2N
6. T removes the unwanted factor eijNθn as prescribed by the protocol, and
the final state is:
|Ωm+d〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijd(θy−θn)eijm(θy−θn) |j〉⊗2N
=
1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
e2piij(m+d)(ly−ln)/D |j〉⊗2N
7. After measuring the state, the result is m+ d instead of m.
Finding the difference between ly and ln: What is missing in order to
complete our attack is to find the difference ly − ln. We now show how an
adversary can learn this difference with overwhelming probability in N . We
assume that the adversary controls a fraction ε of the voters (0 < ε < 1), who
are (all but one) instructed to vote half the times “yes” and the other half “no”.
Instead of destroying the remaining option qudits (exactly εN/2 “yes” and εN/2
“no” votes), the adversary keeps them to run Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Adversary’s algorithm
Input: D, |ψ(θv)〉1 , · · · , |ψ(θv)〉εN/2
Output: l˜ ∈ {0, . . . , D − 1}
1: Record = [0, . . . , 0] ∈ N1×D; . This vector shows us how many values are observed in each interval
2: Solution = [”Null”, ”Null”] ∈ N1×2;
3: i, l,m = 0;
4: while i ≤ εN/2 do
5: Measure |ψ(θv)〉i by using POVM operator E(θ) from Eq.(2), the result is yi;
6: Find the interval for which 2pijD ≤ yi ≤ 2pi(j+1)D ;
7: Record[j] =++;
8: i++;
9: end while
10: while l < D do
11: if Record[l] ≥ 40%(εN/2) then
12: Solution[m] = l;
13: m+ +;
14: end if
15: l + +;
16: end while
17: if Solution == [0, D − 1] then
18: Solution = [Solution[1], Solution[0]];
19: end if
20: return l˜ = Solution[0];
In essence, the algorithm is executed twice - once for each set of option
qudits {|ψ(θv)〉}εN/2, where v ∈ {y, n}. It measures the states in each set and
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attributes to each one an integer number. After all states have been measured,
the algorithm creates a vector Record, which contains the number of times each
integer appeared during the measurements. Finally, Algorithm 1 creates a vector
called Solution in which it registers the values that appeared at least 40% of
times during the measurements, equivalently the values for which the Record
vector assigned a number greater or equal than 40% of times. The algorithm
outputs the first value in the Solution vector. As we see in Figure 2, with high
probability the value that algorithm outputs is either lv or lv−1, for both values
of v. As a result we can find the difference ly − ln.
After having acquired knowledge of ly − ln, the adversary can instruct the
last corrupted voter to change the outcome of the voting process as previously
described.
Fig. 2. The probabilities with which Algorithm 1 records a value in {lv − 1, lv, lv + 1}
after measuring state |ψ(θv)〉 for δ1 = pi235 , δ2 = pi230 , and δ3 = pi(2
6−1)
235
.
Probabilistic analysis: We prove here that the adversary’s algorithm succeeds
with overwhelming probability in N , where N is the number of voters. Therefore
(see Theorem 5), the election protocol needs to run at least exponentially many
times with respect to N in order to guarantee that the success probability of the
adversary is at most 0.25. We present here the necessary lemmas and give the
full proofs in the Supplementary Material.
In order to compute the success probability of the attack, we first need to
compute the probability of measuring a value in the interval (xl, xl+w), where
xl =
2pil
D
, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D − 1}5.
Lemma 2. Let ΘvD,δ ∈ [0, 2pi] be the continuous random variable that describes
the outcome of the measurement of an option qudit |ψ(θv)〉 , v ∈ {y,n} using
operators:
E(θ) =
D
2pi
|Φ(θ)〉 〈Φ(θ)| (2)
5 It is convenient to think of l as the Dth roots of unity.
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where |Φ(θ)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijθ |j〉. It holds that:
Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+w] =
1
2piD
∫ xl+w
xl
sin2[D(θ − θv)/2]
sin2[(θ − θv)/2]
dθ
According to Algorithm 1, an option qudit is attributed with the correct value lv
when the result of the measurement is in the interval [xlv , xlv+1]. Using Lemma
2, we can prove the following:
Lemma 3. Let |ψ(θv)〉 be an option qudit of the protocol. Then it holds:
Pr[xlv < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+1] > 0.405
Lemma 3 shows us that with probability at least 0.405, the result of the measure-
ment is in the interval (xlv , xlv+1). Since Algorithm 1 inserts an integer to the
Solution vector if it corresponds to at least 40% of the total measured values,
lv will most likely be included in the vector (we formally prove it later). Fur-
thermore, we prove in the following lemma that with high probability, there will
be no other values to be inserted in the Solution vector, except the neighbours
of the value lv (namely lv ± 1).
Lemma 4. Let |ψ(θv)〉 be an option qudit of the protocol. Then it holds:
Pr[xlv−1 < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+2] > 0.9
Here we need to note that we are aware of the cases lv ∈ {0, D − 1} where the
members xlv−1 and xlv+2 are not defined. It turns out not to be a problem and
the same thing can be proven for these values (see Supplementary Material).
We have shown that the probability the measurement outcome lies in the
interval (xlv−1, xlv+2), and therefore gets attributed with a value of lv − 1, lv or
lv + 1, is larger than 0.9. If we treat each measurement performed by Algorithm
1 on each option qudit |ψ(θv)〉, as an independent Bernoulli trial with success
probability pl = Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+1], we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. With overwhelming probability in the number of voters N , Algo-
rithm 1 includes lv in the Solution vector.
Pr[Solution[0] = lv ∨ Solution[1] = lv] > 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
We have proven that with overwhelming probability in N , integer lv occupies
one of the two positions of vector Solution, but what about the other value? In
the next theorem, we show that with overwhelming probability in N , the other
value is one of the neighbours of lv, namely lv + 1 or lv − 1.
Theorem 3. With negligible probability in the number of voters N , Algorithm
1 includes a value other than (lv − 1, lv, lv + 1) in the Solution vector, i.e.
∀w ∈ {0, . . . , lv − 2, lv + 2, . . . , D − 1}:
Pr[Solution[0] = w ∨ Solution[1] = w] < 1/exp(Ω(N))
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The following lemma can be proven:
Lemma 5. With overwhelming probability in N , the Solution vector in Algo-
rithm 1, is equal to [lv − 1, lv], [lv, ”Null”] or [lv, lv + 1]. Specifically,
Pr[Solution ∈ {[lv − 1, lv], [lv, ”Null”], [lv, lv + 1]}] > 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
Now consider we have two executions of the Algorithm 1, one for the “yes” and
one for the “no” option qudits. It turns out that the values in the positions
ly − 1 and ln− 1 of the vector Record, follow the same Binomial distribution (it
is easy to see that ply−1 = pln−1). Also, each of them can be seen as a function
of δ which is a monotonic decreasing function that takes a maximum value for
δ = 0 (the proof technique is similar to Lemma 3). At this point the probability
is equal to plv , which is at least 0.405 as we have proven in Lemma 3
6. Armed
with this observation we can prove the next theorem.
Theorem 4. If we define the event “Cheat” as:
Cheat =
[
Algo(y)−Algo(n) = ly − ln
]
where Algo(v) is the execution of Algorithm 1 with v ∈ {y, n}, then it holds that:
Pr[”Cheat”] > 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
Proof. (sketch) Because of the previous observation we know that there exists a
δ0 such that the probability plv−1 is equal to 0.4 for both values of v. It holds
that:
Pr[”Cheat”] = Pr[”Cheat”|δ ∈ [0, δ0)] · Pr[δ ∈ [0, δ0)]
+ Pr[”Cheat”|δ = δ0] · Pr[δ = δ0]
+ Pr[”Cheat”|δ ∈ (δ0, 2pi/D)] · Pr[δ ∈ (δ0, 2pi/D)]
For the first interval, for both values of v, Algorithm 1 registers Solution =
[lv − 1, lv] with overwhelming probability in N . This holds because of Theorem
5 and the previous observation. Therefore, for both values of v the algorithm
outputs the values lv − 1. As a result, ly − 1− (ln − 1) = ly − ln.
In the second case, Pr[δ = δ0] = 0, because δ is a continuous random variable.
In the last case, the probability that the algorithm registers Solution =
[lv − 1, lv] is negligible in N , and by theorem 5 Solution has the form [lv] or
[lv, lv + 1]. So for both values of v, the printed values are ly and ln.
At this point we have proved that the adversary succeeds with overwhelming
probability in N to perform the d-transfer attack in one round. But how many
rounds should the protocol run in order to prevent this attack?
In the next theorem we prove that if the number of rounds ρ is at most
exp(Ω(N)), the adversary succeeds with probability at least 0.25. Although in
6 The same holds for the ply+1, pln+1 except that probability is a monotonic increasing
function with maximum value at point δ = 2pi/D and value equal to plv .
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a small scale election these numbers might not be big, in a large scale election
it is infeasible to run the protocol as many times, making it either inefficient or
insecure. We also note that the probabilistic analysis for one round of execution
is independent of the value D, so it can not be used to improve the security of
the protocol.
Theorem 5. Let (|Φ〉 , |ψ(θy)〉 , |ψ(θn)〉 , δ,D,N) define one round of the proto-
col. If the protocol runs ρ rounds, where 2 ≤ ρ ≤ exp(Ω(N)) , the d-transfer
attack succeeds with probability at least 0.25.
Proof. According to theorem 4 the probability that an adversary successfully
performs the d-transfer attack is:
Pr[”Cheat”] > 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
Now, if the protocol runs ρ times, where 2 ≤ ρ ≤ exp(Ω(N)), this probability
becomes:
(Pr[”Cheat”])ρ > (1− 1/exp(Ω(N)))ρ ≥ (1− 1/ρ)ρ > 0.25
6 Quantum voting based on conjugate coding
This section looks at protocols based on conjugate coding [36,50]. The par-
ticipants in this family of protocols are one or more election authorities7, the
tallier and the voters. The election authorities are only trusted for the purpose
of eligibility in [36]; privacy should be guaranteed by the protocol against both
malicious EA and T . In [50] privacy is not guaranteed against a corrupted elec-
tion authority. Unlike the previous protocols, here the voters do not share any
entangled states with neither EA nor T in order to cast their ballots. One of
the main differences between the protocols in [36] and [50] is the fact that pro-
tocol [36] does not provide any verification of the election outcome, while [50]
does, but at the expense of receipt freeness, which [36] satisfies. Specifically, in
[50] each Vk establishes two keys with T in an anonymous way by using part of
protocol [36] as a subroutine. It’s worth to mention that in order this keys to be
established further interaction between the voters and EA is required and EA
assumed trusted for that task else the privacy of a voter can be violated trivially
with probability 1. At the end of an execution, Vk encrypts the ballot with one
of the keys and sends it to T over a quantum anonymous channel. T announces
the result of each ballot accompanied with the second key so that the voters
can verify that their ballot has been counted. This makes it also possible for a
coercer to verify how a voter voted, by showing them the second key used as a
receipt. It is worth mentioning that protocol [36] could easily be made to satisfy
the same notion of verifiability without needing to trust the election authority
for privacy.
7 In [50] the authors introduced two election authorities in order to distribute the trust
between them.
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6.1 Protocol Specification
A brief description of a protocol [36] execution is as follows:
1. EA picks a vector b¯ = (b1, . . . , bn+1) ∈R {0, 1}n+1, where n the security
parameter of the protocol. This vector will by EA for the encoding of the
ballots and it will be kept secret from T until the end of the ballot casting
phase.
2. For each Vk, EA prepares w = poly(n) blank ballot fragments each of the
form:
|φa¯j ,b¯〉 = |ψa1j ,b1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψan+1j ,bn+1〉 , j ∈ {1, . . . , w}
where a¯j = (a
1
j , . . . , a
n+1
j ) such that:
(a1j , . . . , a
n
j ) ∈R {0, 1}n, an+1j = a1j ⊕ . . .⊕ anj
and:
|ψ0,0〉 = |0〉 , |ψ1,0〉 = |1〉 , |ψ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |ψ1,1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
These w fragments will constitute a blank ballot(e.g the first row of Fig. 3
is a blank ballot fragment).
3. EA sends one blank ballot to each voter Vk over an authenticated channel.
4. After reception of the blank ballot, each Vk re-randomizes it by picking for
each fragment a vector d¯j = (d
1
j , . . . , d
n+1
j ) such that:
(d1j , . . . , d
n
j ) ∈R {0, 1}n, dn+1j = d1j ⊕ . . .⊕ dnj .
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , w}, Vk applies unitary U d¯jj = Y d
1
j ⊗ . . . ⊗ Y dn+1j to the blank
ballot fragment |φa¯j ,b¯〉 ,, where:
Y 1 =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
, Y 0 = I
5. Vk encodes the candidate of choice in the (n + 1)
th-qubit of the last blank
ballot fragments8. For example, if we assume a referendum type election,
Vk votes for c ∈ {0, 1} by applying to the blank ballot fragment |φa¯w,b¯〉 the
unitary operations U c¯w respectively, where: c¯ = (0, . . . , 0, c) (see Fig. 3).
6. Vk sends the ballot to T over an anonymous channel.
7. Once the ballot casting phase ends, EA announces b¯ to T .
8. With this knowledge, T can decode each cast ballot in the correct basis.
Specifically, T decodes each ballot fragment by measuring it in the basis
described by vector b¯ and XORs the resulting bits. After doing this to each
ballot fragment, T ends up with a string, which is the actual vote cast.
9. T announces the election result.
8 Candidate choices are encoded in binary format.
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Fig. 3. The ballot consisting of w ballot fragments, which encode the binary choice
“0. . . 01” in a referendum type election example.
6.2 Vulnerabilities of Conjugate Coding Protocols
The technique underlying this protocol is closely related to the one used in the
first quantum key distribution protocols [3,43]. However, it has some limitations
in the context of these voting schemes.
Malleable blank ballots: An adversary can change the vote of an eligible voter,
by the time the corresponding ballot is cast over the anonymous channel. The
adversary proceeds as follows. Assume Vk has applied the appropriate unitary
on the blank ballot in order to vote for the candidate of their choice. And let
us consider that the last m ballot fragments encode the candidate. When the
adversary sees the cast ballot over the quantum anonymous channel, they apply
the unitary U c¯1w−(m−1), . . . , U
c¯m
w , where cr is either 0 or 1, depending on their
choice to flip the candidate bit or not. As a result the adversary modifies the
ballot of Vk such that it decodes to a different candidate than the intended one.
This is possible because the adversary is aware of the ballot fragments used to
encode the candidate choice. Furthermore, if the adversary has as it is often
unavoidable, side channel information about the likely winning candidate (from
pre-election polls for instance), they will be able to change the vote encoded
in the ballot into one of their desire. This is possible because the adversary
is aware of which bits are encoded in the ballot more frequently. As a result,
the adversary knows exactly which unitary operator to apply in order to get a
specific candidate.
Violation of privacy: The EA can introduce a “serial number” in a blank
ballot to identify a voter, i.e some of the blank ballot fragments in the head of
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the ballot decode to “1” instead of “0”. This allows the EA to decode any ballot
cast over the quantum anonymous channel, linking the identity of the voters
with their choice. The authors acknowledged this issue and tried to identify a
secure audit mechanism for the integrity of the blank ballots without providing
a fully developed solution.
One-more-unforgeability: The security of the protocol relies on a new hard
quantum problem introduced in [36], which they name one-more-unforgeability.
The security game that illustrates this assumption goes as follows: a challenger
encodes w blank ballot fragments in a basis b¯ and gives them to the adversary.
The adversary wins the game if they produce w+ 1 valid blank ballot fragments
in the basis b¯. The authors claim that the probability with which the adversary
wins this game is at most 1/2 + 1/2(negl(n)). The assumption that this new
problem is computationally hard for a quantum adversary needs to be further
studied, even though it does seem reasonable.
On the security parameter: Because of the ballots’ malleability, an adversary
could substitute the parts of the corrupted voters’ blank ballot fragments that
encode a candidate, with blank ballot fragments in a random base. Of course
these ballots would open into random candidates in a specific domain but would
still be valid, since the leading zeros would not be affected by this change. This is
because blank ballots contain no entanglement. Now the adversary can keep these
valid spare blank ballot fragments to create new valid blank ballots. To address
this problem, the size of blank ballots needs to be substantially big compared to
the number of voters and the size of the candidate space (Nm << w).
7 Other Protocols
Other protocols have also been proposed, however, we do not include them in this
review, as they are not fully developed and can therefore not be appropriately
analyzed [44,49,23]. The characteristic of these protocols is that EA controls
when ballots get counted. This can be achieved with either the use of shared
GHZ states [19] between EA, T , and Vk [44,49] or Bell pairs [44] between T and
Vk with EA knowing the identity of the holder of each pair particle. We will not
present these protocols in detail as they have many and serious flaws making
even the correctness arguable.
In [49] the proposed protocol is claimed to provide verifiability of the election
outcome, but without explaining how this can be achieved. From our understand-
ing of the protocol this seems unlikely to be the case. From the description of the
protocol each voter can change their mind and announce a different vote from
the originally cast one. This is possible because the function every voter uses to
encode their vote is not committed in any way.
Another two protocols introduced in [44], have similar limitations. For in-
stance, there is no mechanism for verifiability of the election outcome. In addi-
tion, privacy against T is not satisfied in contrast to protocols we saw in section
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5. This is because each voter’s vote is handled individually and not in a ho-
momorphic manner. All of these could be achieved just by a classical secure
channel.
Lastly, the protocol appearing in [23] shares many of the limitations of the
former protocols as well as some further ones. The method introduced for detect-
ing eavesdropping in the election process is insecure, as trust is put into another
voter in order to detect any deviation from the protocol specification. Moreover,
the way each voter votes is not well defined. For example, by the description of
the voting procedure, privacy can be violated trivially or a voter never votes.
8 Discussion
In this work, we have examined the current state of the art in quantum e-voting,
by presenting the most prominent proposals and analyzing their security. What
we have found is that all the proposed protocols fail to satisfy the necessary
cryptographic standards in order to be implemented in the future.
Despite this, these protocols open the way to new avenues of research, specif-
ically on whether quantum information can solve some long-standing issues in
e-voting and cryptography in general. By studying them, we can identify several
interesting ideas for further development as well as possible bottlenecks in future
quantum protocols. For instance, we have seen that, unless combined with some
new technique, the traveling ballot protocols do not seem to provide a viable so-
lution, as double-voting is always possible, and there is no straightforward way
to guarantee privacy. On the other hand, the distributed ballot protocols give us
very strong privacy guarantees because of the entanglement between the ballot
states. It is possible that by using a similar type of protocol, we might be able
to prove unconditional privacy in a composable framework.
Unfortunately, verifiability is not guaranteed in distributed ballot protocols,
and appears to be very hard to achieve against a malicious tallier [13]. An equally
important problem present in this type of protocols is double voting. In [22],
the authors present an interesting solution, which however might still allow an
adversary to vote multiple times, by taking advantage of unused ballots. In order
to prevent this, the protocol would need to run exponentially many times with
respect to the number of voters, which would in practice be inefficient. It might
be possible to overcome this specific issue, but in order to prevent other forms
of attacks, a formal proof is necessary in an appropriate model [45,21,7]. One
plausible idea of how to improve the protocol to be resistant against the attack
we presented in Section 5 is to choose different values of δ for each ballot. If this
was possible, then the attack we described would not be applicable as it relies
on the fact that all ballot states share the same δ. On the other hand this is not
an easy task because if the δ’s are different for each ballot, it is not obvious how
the tallier could compute the correct result, since the protocol’s correctness is
based on a homomorphic property that allows getting the correct result out of
the combination of all ballots.
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The same observation also holds for [36], where the election authority uses
the same k in order to encode each ballot. If each voter could use a cut-and-
choose technique in the same sense as in [1] (where each voter tests that a ballot
is prepared correctly from the Voting Support Device in order to be cast to the
Bulletin Board), a corrupted election authority could not violate the privacy or
the correctness of the ballot. But again the problem is that different values of k
encode different ballots. As a result, like in the previous case, even an execution of
the protocol where everyone acts honestly would not work. It is a very intriguing
open question whether these two properties can be achieved at the same time.
Regarding the protocols in section 3, the cut-and-choose technique used is
both inefficient and insecure. An inherent problem with this type of technique
in the case of one prover and one verifier, is that the number of sampled states
grows exponentially with respect to the protocol parameter in order to achieve
a satisfied level of security. In the case of the protocols in section 3, even if
the sampled states are as many as in the single prover/single verifier case, the
protocol still it is not secure. However, the verification process is done in a very
specific way, and it would be interesting to study if there are other options to
explore in order to improve it. A possible solution could be to provide some
type of randomness to the voters (in the form of a common random string for
example), which will define if a state should be verified or used for the voting
phase (a similar testing process has been studied in the past for other types of
entangled states, both in theory [37] and experimentally [34]). However, even
if the problem with the cut-and-choose technique is addressed in future works,
privacy can still be violated as we have seen, and possible corrections might
require the use of more advanced techniques. Notwithstanding these limitations,
we believe that our analysis opens new research directions for the study of the
quantum cut-and-choose technique, which plays a fundamental role in the secure
distribution of quantum information, in the multi-party setting.
Concerning verifiability, the main problem is that all definitions seem unlikely
to be satisfied by a quantum protocol for many reasons. For instance, every
definition of verifiability in [13] assumes a trusted Bulletin Board, BB, where
each voter can read and write on it. After the end of the election, the auditors
in order to verify the integrity of the election procedure, will read the context
of the BB and output either accept or reject. A quantum analogy would require
a quantum Bulletin Board, QBB, on which the voters would be able to read or
write. Moreover, at the end of the election procedure, the auditors should have
access to the QBB in order to verify the integrity of the election procedure. In
general, both voters and auditors must be able to read the contexts of QBB in
order to either verify if a ballot has been recorded or the election outcome is
correct, as in classical election protocols. But as we know if someone reads a
quantum state, in our case a QBB, then the state will be disturbed, something
that does not happen with classical information. So the following question arises:
what definition for verifiability should we adopt, that would capture both the
properties of a public verifiable election protocol and the behavior of quantum
information.
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Finally, in order for a quantum protocol to be of any interest, it should not
only provide at least the same security guarantees compared to classical protocols
under the same assumptions, but rather propose some improvement on at least
one aspect, may it be security or efficiency. In the past, quantum protocols have
been proposed [8] and implemented [38], that achieve better-than-classical guar-
antees. Other interesting settings relevant to quantum implementations, include
bounded adversaries (i.e. that have limited storage [14], noisy storage [29], or are
bounded by relativistic constraints [32]), and have already achieved information-
theoretic security for basic cryptographic primitives like bit commitment and
oblivious transfer.
The question whether quantum technology could enhance electronic voting
has not yet been answered, and requires further study of both the existing classi-
cal and quantum literature. First, bottlenecks in classical election protocols that
could potentially be solved by using quantum subroutines, need to be identified.
Then, quantum protocols need to be designed, secure in composable frameworks
against well articulated definitions of all the required properties. We hope that
this review will be the starting point of a critical analysis and further study of
quantum electronic voting.
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Supplementary Material
Now we give detailed proofs of the theorems and lemmas that appear in the
main text.
Lemma 2 Let ΘvD,δ ∈ [0, 2pi] be the continuous random variable that describes
the outcome of the measurement of a vote state |ψ(θv)〉 , v ∈ {y,n} using opera-
tors
E(θ) =
D
2pi
|Φ(θ)〉 〈Φ(θ)| (3)
where |Φ(θ)〉 = 1√
D
D−1∑
j=0
eijθ |j〉. It holds that:
Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+w] =
1
2piD
∫ xl+w
xl
sin2[D(θ − θv)/2]
sin2[(θ − θv)/2]
dθ (4)
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Proof.
Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+w] = 〈φ(θv)|
∫ xl+w
xl
E(θ)dθ |φ(θv)〉
=
∫ xl+w
xl
〈φ(θv)|E(θ) |φ(θv)〉 dθ
=
D
2piD2
∫ xl+w
xl
|
D−1∑
j=0
e(θ−θv)ij |2dθ
=
1
2piD
∫ xl+w
xl
([
D−1∑
j=0
cos[(θ − θv)j]]2
+ [
D−1∑
j=0
sin[(θ − θv)j]]2)dθ
For any x ∈ R, the following two equations hold:
D−1∑
j=0
cos[jx] =
sin[Dx/2]
sin[x/2]
cos[(D − 1)x/2]
D−1∑
j=0
sin[jx] =
sin[Dx/2]
sin[x/2]
sin[(D − 1)x/2]
So finally we have:
Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+w] =
1
2piD
∫ xl+w
xl
sin2[D(θ − θv)/2]
sin2[(θ − θv)/2]
dθ
Lemma 3 Let |ψ(θv)〉 be a voting state of the protocol. Then it holds:
Pr[xlv < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+1] > 0.405
Proof. A simple change of variables in Eq.(4) gives us:
Pr[xlv < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+1] =
1
2piD
∫ 2pi/D
0
sin2[D(θ − δ)/2]
sin2[(θ − δ)/2] dθ
By setting (θ − δ)/2 = y, we get:
Pr[xlv < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+1] =
1
piD
∫ (2pi/D−δ)/2
−δ/2
sin2[Dy]
sin2[y]
dy
The above is just a function of δ, which we denote as F (δ). In order to
lower-bound F (δ) we need to find its derivative:
dF (δ)
dδ
=
1
2piD
(
sin2[Dδ/2]
sin2[δ/2]
− sin
2[Dδ/2]
sin2[(2pi/D − δ)/2]
)
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It is easy to check that:
dF (δ)
dδ
= 0, when δ = 0 or δ = pi/D
dF (δ)
dδ
> 0, when 0 < δ < pi/D
dF (δ)
dδ
< 0, when pi/D < δ < 2pi/D
It also holds that F (0) = F (2pi/D), so the minimum extreme points of our
function are equal. As a result we have:
F (δ) ≥ lim
δ→0−
F (δ) = F (0) (5)
From the fact that:
| sin[x]| ≤ |x|,∀x ∈ R
| sin[x]| ≥ |(2/pi)x|,∀x ∈ [0, pi/2]
| sin[x]| ≥ | − (2/pi)x+ 2|,∀x ∈ [pi/2, pi]
It follows:
F (0) ≥ 1
piD
∫ pi
2D
0
( 2
piDy
)2
/y2dy +
∫ pi
D
pi
2D
( 2
piDy
+ 2
)2
/y2dy
≥ 4
pi2
> 0.405
Now in order to prove lemma 4, we need the following proposition:
Proposition 2. ∀x ∈ [−2pi, 2pi] it holds that:
sin2[x] >
20∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 2
2n−1x2n
(2n)!
(6)
Proof. From the Taylor series expansion at point 0 of cos[x], we know that:
cos[x] =
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n x
2n
(2n)!
, ∀x ∈ R
Then:
sin2[x] =
1
2
− cos[2x]
2
=
1
2
− 1
2
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n 2
2nx2n
(2n)!
=
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 2
2n−1x2n
(2n)!
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Given the above equation, in order to prove Eq.(6), we simply need to show:
∞∑
n=21
(−1)n+1 2
2n−1x2n
(2n)!
> 0
If we think of the above as a sum of terms an (n = 21, . . . ,∞), for integer j ≥ 10,
it holds that:
an > 0, when n = 2j + 1,
an < 0, when n = 2j.
We therefore need to prove that
∞∑
n=21
an > 0, which in turn is equivalent to
proving that:
|an| > |an+1| ⇐⇒ 22n−1x2n/(2n)! > 22n+1x2n+2/(2n+ 2)!
⇐⇒ 1 > 4x2/((2n+ 1)(2n+ 2))
⇐⇒ (2n+ 1)(2n+ 2)/4 > x2
In this case, the above holds, because the minimum value of n is 21 and the
maximum value of x2 is 4pi2.
Lemma 4 Let |ψ(θv)〉 be a voting state of the protocol. Then it holds:
Pr[xlv−1 < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+2] > 0.9
Proof. We follow exactly the same procedure as lemma 3 and get:
Pr[xlv−1 < Θ
v
D,δ < xlv+2] (7)
=
1
2piD
∫ xlv+2
xlv−1
sin2[D(θ − θv)/2]
sin2[(θ − θv)/2]
dθ
=
1
2piD
∫ 4pi/D
−2pi/D
sin2[D(θ − δ)/2]
sin2[(θ − δ)/2] dθ
=
1
piD
∫ 2pi/D−δ/2
−pi/D−δ/2
sin2[Dy]
sin2[y]
dy (8)
where (θ − δ)/2 = y. Again the above probability depends only on δ and can
therefore be denoted with F (δ). In a similar way as before, we can prove that
the minimum of this function is at δ = 0 and compute F (0).
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F (0) =
1
piD
∫ 2pi/D
−pi/D
sin2[Dy]
sin2[y]
dy
≥ 1
piD
∫ 2pi/D
−pi/D
20∑
n=1
(−1)n+122n−1(Dy)2n
(2n)!
y2
dy
=
1
piD
20∑
n=1
∫ 2pi/D
−pi/D
(−1)n+122n−1D2ny2n
y2(2n)!
dy
=
1
piD
20∑
n=1
(−1)n+122n−1D2n
(2n)!
∫ 2pi/D
−pi/D
y2(n−1)dy
=
1
piD
20∑
n=1
(−1)n+122n−1D2n
(2n)!
[y2n−1/(2n− 1)]2pi/D−pi/D
=
20∑
n=1
(−1)n+122n−1
(2n)!
pi2n−2(22n−2 + 1)
2n− 1
≈ 0.9263 (9)
Theorem 2 With overwhelming probability in the number of voters N , algo-
rithm 1 includes lv in the Solution vector (i.e. it measures a value in the interval
[xlv , xlv+1] more than 40% of the time).
Pr[Solution[0] = lv ∨ Solution[1] = lv] > 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
Proof. We can see each measurement that algorithm 1 performs at each vote
state |ψ(θv)〉, as an independent Bernoulli trial Xl with probability of success
pl = Pr[xl < Θ
v
D,δ < xl+1]. Then the value of Record[l] follows the binomial
distribution:
XRecord[l] ∼ B(εN
2
, pl)
We can therefore compute:
Pr
[
Solution[0] = lv ∨ Solution[1] = lv
]
= Pr
[
Record[lv] ≥ 0.4εN/2
]
≥ 1− Pr [Record[lv] ≤ 0.4εN/2]
1
= 1− Pr [Record[lv] ≤ (1− γ)plvεN/2]
2≥ 1− exp(−γ2plvεN/6)
= 1− (exp(−γ2plvε/6))N
= 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
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Theorem 3 With negligible probability in the number of voters N , algorithm
1 includes a value other than (lv − 1, lv, lv + 1) in the Solution vector, i.e.
∀w ∈ {0, . . . , lv − 2, lv + 2, . . . , D − 1}:
Pr[Solution[0] = w ∨ Solution[1] = w] < 1/exp(Ω(N))
Proof. Let w ∈ {0, . . . , D − 1} \ {lv − 1, lv, lv + 1}, then it holds:
Pr[Solution[0] = w ∨ Solution[1] = w]
= Pr[XRecord[w] ≥ 0.4εN/2]
We know from lemma 4 that pw < 0.1, so ∃γ > 0 such that:9
Pr[XRecord[w] ≥ 0.4εN/2]
= Pr[XRecord[w] ≥ (1 + γ)pwεN/2]
< exp(−γpwεN/6)
= (exp(−γpwε/6))N
= 1/exp(Ω(N))
Lemma 5 With overwhelming probability in N , the Solution vector in algo-
rithm 1, is equal to [lv − 1, lv], [lv, “Null”] or [lv, lv + 1].Specifically,
Pr[Solution ∈ {[lv − 1, lv], [lv, “Null”], [lv, lv + 1]}]
> 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
Proof. Let as define the following events:
A =
[
Solution[0] = w ∨ Solution[1] = w,
w ∈ {0, . . . , lv − 2, lv + 2, . . . , D − 1}
]
B =
[
Solution[0] = lv ∨ Solution[1] = lv
]
Since the cases Solution = [lv, lv − 1] and Solution = [lv + 1, lv] are impos-
sible from the construction of the algorithm, from theorems 2 and 3 it holds:
Pr[Solution ∈ {[lv − 1, lv], [lv, “Null”], [lv, lv + 1]}]
= Pr[B ∧ ¬A]
= Pr[B]− Pr[B ∧A]
> 1− 1/exp(Ω(N))
1 plv > 0.405 =⇒ ∃γ > 0 s.t 0.4 = (1− γ)plv
2 The Chernoff bound for a random variable X ∼ B(N, p) and expected value E[X] =
µ is: Pr[X ≤ (1− γ)µ] ≤ exp(−γ2µ/3)
9 The Chernoff bound for a random variable X ∼ B(N, p) and expected value E[X] =
µ is: Pr[X ≤ (1 + γ)µ] ≤ exp(−γµ/3), γ > 1
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Lemma 6. Let |ψ(θv)〉 be a voting state with δ ∈ [0, 2pi/D) and lv = D−1,where
δ is a continuous random variable .Then it holds:
Pr[xD−2 < ΘvD,δ < xD] + Pr[x0 < Θ
v
D,δ < x1] > 0.9
Proof.
Pr[x0 < Θ
v
D,δ < x1] (10)
= 1/(2piD)
∫ x1
x0
(
Sin[D/2(θ − θv)]
Sin[1/2(θ − θv)] )
2dθ (11)
Now we set θ = θ − xD to 11 and we have:
Pr[x0 < Θ
v
D,δ < x1] (12)
= 1/(2piD)
∫ xD+x1
xD
(
Sin[−Dpi +D/2(θ − θv)]
Sin[−pi + 1/2(θ − θv)] )
2dθ (13)
= 1/(2piD)
∫ xD+x1
xD
(
Sin[D/2(θ − θv)]
Sin[1/2(θ − θv)] )
2dθ (14)
Finally we have:
Pr[xD−2 < ΘvD,δ < xD] + Pr[x0 < Θ
v
D,δ < x1] (15)
= 1/(2piD)
∫ xD+x1
xD−2
(
Sin[D/2(θ − θv)]
Sin[1/2(θ − θv)] )
2dθ (16)
= 1/(2piD)
∫ 4pi/D
−2pi/D
Sin2[D(θ − δ)/2]
Sin2[(θ − δ)/2] dθ (17)
From lemma 4 this integral is at least 0.9
The proof is similar for lv = 0.
Lemma 7. Let Solution be the matrix of algorithm 1, then it holds:
Pr[Solution ∈ {{lv − 1, lv}, {lv}, {lv, lv + 1}}]
= Pr[Solution ∈ {[lv − 1, lv], [lv], [lv, lv + 1]}]
Proof. (sketch)It holds that:
Pr[Solution ∈ {{lv − 1, lv}, {lv}, {lv, lv + 1}}] (18)
= Pr[Solution ∈ {lv − 1, lv}] (19)
+ Pr[Solution ∈ {lv}] (20)
+ Pr[Solution ∈ {lv, lv + 1}] (21)
We need to prove that:
Pr[Solution ∈ {lv − 1, lv}] = Pr[Solution = [lv − 1, lv]] (22)
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From the construction of the algorithm 1 we know that:
Pr[Solution = [lv, lv − 1]|Solution ∈ {lv − 1, lv}] = 0 (23)
This is true because the values of the Solution are from the matrix Record in a
progressive manner. So under the assumption that both lv, lv − 1 had appeared
at least 40% times, they inserted in a progressive order. The only time they will
not is the case in which lv = 0 and lv−1 = D−1. At first the order is [0, D−1],
but because of the special condition we had in our algorithm the order switches
to [D − 1, 0].
It holds that:
Pr[Solution = [lv, lv − 1]|Solution ∈ {lv − 1, lv}] (24)
= Pr[Solution = [lv, lv − 1]] + Pr[∅] (25)
= Pr[Solution = [lv, lv − 1]] (26)
= 0 (27)
Similar are the other cases.
